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FACTIONS, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE APA: FOUR
LESSONS SINCE 1946
Cass R. Sunstein*
M UCH of administrative law is common law. Despite Justice
Jackson's suggestion that the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) furnished "a formula upon which opposing social and politi-
cal forces have come to rest,"' the common law process has con-
verted that statute into something very different from what its
drafters anticipated. This phenomenon should not be surprising.
In light of the diversity of administrative functions and the rapid-
ity of changes in regulatory policy, it would be quite difficult, and
probably undesirable, to achieve consistent application of a general
framework over time. Flexibility-in some respects a hallmark of
the common law-is especially valuable in administrative law.
In attempting to control administrative processes, the drafters of
the APA responded to two quite general constitutional themes,
both of which have played a central role in administrative law
since its inception. The first concerns the usurpation of govern-
ment by powerful private groups. 2 The second involves the danger
of self-interested representation: the pursuit by political actors of
interests that diverge from those of the citizenry.3 The relative in-
sulation of administrators from electoral control has given rise to
particularly intense fears about these two risks. But the forty years
since the enactment of the APA have brought significant advances
in knowledge about regulation and administrative law-advances
that have important implications for the question of how the legal
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Frank H. Easterbrook, Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Michael W. McConnell, Geoffrey P. Miller, Richard A. Posner, Stephen H.
Schulhofer, Geoffrey R. Stone, and David A. Strauss for helpful comments on a previous
draft, and to Jeremy Friedman and Cathryn Ruggeri for research assistance and useful
ideas.
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
2 See generally The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison) (discussing the dangers of faction).
See generally id. No. 51 (A. Hamilton) (checks and balances regulate self-interest of
political actors).
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system should respond to the risks of factional tyranny and self-
interested representation.
Four of these advances have been of particular importance.
First, it is now possible to identify, with far more sophistication,
the functions and malfunctions of regulation. Second, it is clear
that dangers to statutory standards lie in unlawful inaction and
deregulation as well as in overzealous regulation. Third, faith in
administrative expertise has diminished in the wake of a more re-
fined understanding of the complementary roles of technical so-
phistication on one hand and "politics" on the other. That under-
standing has brought forth what might be called a deliberative
conception of the role of the administrator-a conception that is,
however, threatened by a still-tentative trend in the Supreme
Court. Fourth, courts have shown themselves to suffer from serious
limitations as supervisors of agency discretion; there is a corre-
sponding need for nonjudicial mechanisms of supervision.
This article will outline these advances, describe their implica-
tions for administrative action and judicial review, and relate them
to the general effort to guard against factional power and self-in-
terested representation. Some of these lessons have already begun
to find their way into regulatory statutes, agency behavior, and
doctrines used in judicial review. Others have not, but one may
hope that they will be incorporated into the law in the reasonably
near future.
I. THE FUNCTIONS AND MALFUNCTIONS OF REGULATION
The legislative history of the APA shows almost no sign of inter-
est in substantive issues of regulation. But one of the principal les-
sons of the past forty years is that questions of administrative law
cannot be answered without some understanding of the possible
functions of regulation. In the years since enactment of the APA, it
has become possible to be quite explicit about those functions.4
First, regulation may protect interests that are considered enti-
tlements-with the class of entitlements being defined by refer-
ence to values apart from positive law. The best example is protec-
4 For different accounts of the functions of regulation, see S. Breyer, Regulation and its
Reform 15-35 (1982); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Con-
stitution, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 288-90 (1982).
[Vol. 72:271
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tion against discrimination on the basis of race and sex.5 At least
for some observers, protection against discrimination has assumed
the role played by protection of private contract and property in
the common law era.
Second, regulation may redistribute wealth to people who are
thought to be badly off. The minimum wage is a good example.
Whether and how regulation will redistribute resources is a com-
plex question,6 but improving the lot of the unfortunate is often an
intended effect of regulation.
Third, regulation may promote economic "efficiency." Occupa-
tional safety and health standards, for example, may be a response
to lack of information or to externalities, and regulation of air pol-
lution may be a product of a collective good problem."
Fourth, regulation may be designed to shape or discourage cer-
tain preferences or-a related point-to reflect the public's "pref-
erences about preferences." Like Ulysses confronted with the Si-
rens,8 the public may decide to bind itself with laws that prohibit
the gratification of short-term consumption choices.9 Prevention of
discrimination illustrates the phenomenon of shaping preferences,
as do the laws prohibiting sexual harassment.10 Seat-belt laws, so-
cial security provisions, and laws prohibiting cigarette advertise-
ments11 may be efforts to foreclose misguided consumption
choices.
Fifth, regulation may be paternalistic, reflecting a desire to pre-
vent people from making decisions that will harm them.12 Here,
5 See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193,
1314 (1982).
' On the minimum wage, see F. Welch, Minimum Wages: Issues and Evidence 4 (1978);
on redistribution in general, see, e.g., Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bar-
gaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563 (1982).
7 See S. Breyer, supra note 4, at 23-28. There is considerable literature about the differ-
ent sorts of "market failure" that may call for a regulatory solution. See, e.g., id. at 15-35; R.
Noll & B. Owen, The Political Economy of Deregulation 53-64 (1983).
' See J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens 36-37 (1979).
' See Sax, The Claims for Retention of the Public Lands, in Rethinking the Federal
Lands 125 (S. Brubaker ed. 1984).
,8 See generally C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979) (analyzing
the law of sexual harassment).
" See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences (unpublished manuscript
1986) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
12 For discussion of paternalism, see Kennedy, supra note 6; Kronman, Paternalism and
1986] 273
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however, the government, and not the public itself, prohibits the
satisfaction of consumption choices."3 Some occupational safety
and health regulations may be thus understood.
Finally-and this is an important point-regulation may reflect
little or nothing more than interest-group pressures and thus serve
no public purpose.14 Many regulatory programs, including regula-
tion of utility price levels15 and licensing of interstate motor carri-
ers,16 have been described in this way. This notion is the "dark
side" of the redistribution-of-resources rationale for regulation: the
redistribution may turn out to benefit particular classes for no rea-
son other than political power.
These understandings of the possible functions of regulation
have led to refined attacks on regulatory schemes. Such at-
tacks-and the current enthusiasm for deregulation17 -- usually rely
on a critique of one or another of these functions. Advocates of
deregulation may conclude that a particular justification for regu-
lation is inapplicable in the circumstances or insufficient to justify
the burdens regulation imposes. One may argue, for example, that
some interests protected through regulation should not be re-
garded as entitlements at all:1 8 the interests of the trucking and
airline industries in avoiding competition, for example, are hard to
place in the category of "rights." For some, moreover, regulation
does not protect rights but instead violates them.19 Alternatively,
the redistribution that regulation brings about may be perverse or
have unfortunate collateral consequences.2 ° Instead of promoting
the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J. 763 (1983).
13 Paternalism is of course a highly controversial basis for intervention. See Dworkin, Pa-
ternalism, in Morality and the Law 107 (R. Wasserstrom ed' 1971); D. Parfit, Reasons and
Persons 321 (1984); Regan, Justifications for Paternalism, in The Limits of Law: XV NO-
MOS 189 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1974); Kronman, supra note 12, at 774-97.
14 See Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Govern-
ment Regulation, 15 J.L. & Econ. 151 (1972); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
15 See Jordan, supra note 14, at 155-60; Stigler, supra note 14, at 5.
1 See Stigler, supra note 14, at 7-9.
17 See Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Gov-
ernment vii (1985); see also R. Noll & B. Owen, supra note 7 (study advocating regulatory
reform).
18 See Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 Yale L.J. 1129 (1983).
19 Consider the debate over the fairness doctrine. See, e.g., Powe, "Or of the [Broadcast]
Press," 55 Tex. L. Rev. 39 (1976).
20 See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 356-59 (2d ed. 1977) (housing codes); F.
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"efficiency," regulation may impede innovation, l stifle competi-
tion,22 and impose costs that outweigh whatever benefits it pro-
duces.23 The process of regulation is expensive to taxpayers, and
compliance costs may be high as well. It is a familiar point that
"political failure" may turn out to be more harmful than the "mar-
ket failure" that gave rise to regulation in the first place.
Moreover, the notions of shaping preferences, reflecting the pub-
lic's "preference about preferences," and paternalism may mask a
naked interest-group transfer, amount to unjustified meddling in
the affairs of others, or impose the tastes of one group rather than
another in circumstances where there is no basis for choice be-
tween them.24 Where regulation has been an interest-group deal
serving no public purpose, there is of course no reason to retain it.
One cannot say in the abstract whether the affirmative case for
regulation, or the corresponding critique, is more persuasive. Nev-
ertheless, it is easy to identify the general presumptions that un-
derlie the views of those with disparate attitudes toward market
ordering: some are skeptical of regulatory interventions on the
ground that they will generally do more harm than good, 5 while
others will be receptive to change because of their skepticism
about the existing distribution of entitlements and income and the
existing set of preferences.2 6 In particular cases, however, a deci-
sion whether to regulate27 should not turn only on presumptions.
Welch, supra note 6, at 33-44 (minimum wage laws); Kronman, Contract Law and Distribu-
tive Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 472, 507-08 (1980) (minimum wage and rent control laws); Shavell,
A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional
Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 414 (1981) (arguing
against use of regulation to redistribute resources).
2 See Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Frame-
work, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1256, 1288-1307 (1981).
2 See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1336
(1985).
,3 See Office of Management and Budget, supra note 17, at vii.
2' See Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92
Yale L.J. 1537, 1547-56 (1983).
'5 See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States
Government, April 1, 1985-March 31, 1986 (1985); Epstein, Takings: Private Property and
the Power of Eminent Domain 263-82 (1985).
26 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 6, at 571.
27 It is now well accepted that the common law system is itself a regulatory scheme. See
M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 1-30 (1978); R. Posner, supra
note 20, at 179-91. For this reason, a decision to abandon federal regulation should not be
understood as a return to an "unregulated" system. See generally, Kennedy, The Role of
1986] 275
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Proper regulatory decisionmaking requires inquiries into the actual
goals of the regulatory scheme, the extent to which those goals may
be promoted, and the collateral costs of regulation.
Knowledge about the functions and malfunctions of regulation
has contributed significantly to the performance of regulatory
agencies. For example, the decision of the National Highway and
Traffic Safety Administration to reduce the minimum performance
standard for automobile bumpers was based on a conclusion that
such reductions would reduce costs without increasing risks to
safety and health.28 The decision of the Federal Communications
Commission to remove guidelines for nonentertainment program-
ming in the radio industry depended on the FCC's finding that,
under current conditions, the market would provide sufficient di-
versity.29 The conclusion of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission that oil pipeline rate regulation should serve only as a cap
on extreme prices, and that competitive forces can ensure proper
rate levels,30 derived from a perception that the modern economic
setting does not pose the same risk of monopoly that concerned
the Congress that enacted the statute requiring "just and reasona-
ble" pipeline rates.
Knowledge of the possible functions and malfunctions of regula-
tion has also played an important role in the courts. Decisions up-
holding deregulation illustrate the point particularly well." More-
over, many of the cases invalidating deregulation are based on a
perceived "mismatch" between the justification for deregulation
and the goals of the regulatory scheme. For example, the decision
of the Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 Am. U.L. Rev. 939,
964-67 (1985). The term "regulate" is used here to conform to common usage.
28 See Denial of Petitions for Reconsideration, Bumper Standard (rule codified at 49
C.F.R. § 581 (1985)); see also Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1344-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (upholding deregulation).
19 See Report and Order, Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 975-77 (1981); see also
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1420 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (upholding deregulation of nonentertainment programming).
30 See Williams Pipe Line Co., 21 FERC (CCH) 1 61,260, at 61,597 (Nov. 30; 1982). But
see Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir.) (invalidating the action
taken by the FERC), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 507 (1984).
31 See supra notes 28-29. See also Wold Communications v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (deregulation of satellite transponder sales upheld based on finding of market compe-
tition); NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (deregulation of television station
acquisitions upheld based on finding of no problem of concentration of ownership).
[Vol. 72:271
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tion v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.3 2 resulted in part
from a conclusion that the agency had undertaken an inquiry into
costs and benefits that conflicted with the special status the stat-
ute conferred upon the safety of automobile passengers." Other
cases invalidating deregulation reflect a related inquiry into sub-
stantive regulatory issues.3 Finally, several of the decisions invali-
dating regulatory initiatives rest on a sophisticated understanding
of the possible malfunctions of regulation. 5
Perhaps surprisingly, the use of these theories of regulation has
made agencies and courts better able to deal with the risks of self-
interested representation and factional power over the regulatory
process. The fact that regulation may amount to an interest-group
deal serving no public purpose carries important implications for
review of agency action under the "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard of the APA.3 6 If an agency-promulgated regulation amounts
to such a deal, it is likely to be unlawful under that standard. The
judicial ability to untangle the various purposes of regulation, and
to determine whether the challenged agency action serves those
purposes, has made it far easier for courts to "flush out" impermis-
sible bases for regulatory action. Increasing sophistication about
the functions and malfunctions of regulation has thus played an
important role in improving the performance of both regulatory
agencies and reviewing courts.
II. THE DANGERS OF INACTION AND DEREGULATION
The past forty years have demonstrated that risks to statutory
schemes are posed by unlawful inaction and deregulation as well as
by unlawful regulation. The original purpose of administrative law
was to protect private autonomy-most important, private prop-
erty-from unauthorized governmental intrusions.3 7 Judge-made
32 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
33 463 U.S. at 48-49.
U See, e.g., Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1500-10 (D.C. Cir.) (reg-
ulation contravenes statutory directive), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 507 (1984).
" See, e.g., Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1978)
(holding that swimming pool slide regulations must be evaluated on the basis of actual po-
tential for improving safety and the effects of the regulation on the utility, cost, and availa-
bility of the product.)
36 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
37 See, e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev.
1986]
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doctrines primarily sought to enable regulated entities to fend off
unlawful government action: rules governing reviewability ensured
that members of the regulated class would have access to judicial
review," and the principle of standing limited that access to the
regulated class, excluding the beneficiaries of regulation. s9 In the
face of ambiguity in the APA on the point,40 however, courts have
abandoned the notion that protection of traditional private rights,
as defined by the common law, is the sole function of the regula-
tory process.4'
This development is a product of three perceptions. The first is
that statutes may be undermined through inaction and deregula-
tion as well as through overzealous enforcement. In recent years,
litigants have made at least plausible and sometimes powerful ar-
guments that agencies have unlawfully failed to enforce laws pro-
tecting the environment, civil rights, labor unions, consumers, and
others.42 As Louis Jaffe suggested nearly half a century ago,
"[i]nterests intended as the beneficiaries of legislative munificence
will have cold comfort from embracing the dry, unmoving skeleton
of the statute. '43
The second perception is that the "rights ' 44 created by regula-
1667, 1671-76 (1975); see also J. Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law
20 (1978) (discussing the legal interest test).
See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181-83 (1967).
19 See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-81 (1938).
40 The APA allows courts to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed." See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982). It also defines agency action to include "failure to
act." Id. § 551(13). At the same time, it immunizes from review those decisions that are
"committed to agency discretion by law," id. 701(a)(2). In light of the then-prevalent pre-
sumption in favor of prosecutorial discretion, see, e.g., Dunn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n,
Local 1529, 307 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1962), it would be difficult to conclude that the APA
authorized review of inaction in all circumstances.
" Congress has often endorsed such developments, specifically authorizing beneficiaries
of regulatory programs to bring suit to compel action. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act, § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, § 336,
42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1982); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § 12(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1982).
42 See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 565 (1985); Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers Local 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564
(10th Cir. 1981); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973); EDF v. Ruckelshaus,
439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 554 F.
Supp. 242 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
4' Jaffe, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 485
(1940).
'4 There are difficulties, however, in treating statutory benefits as "rights." See generally
[Vol. 72:271
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tory schemes are no less deserving of legal protection than those
recognized at common law. The traditional focus on private rights,
a holdover from the Lochner era, became untenable with a recog-
nition that those rights grew out of a highly controversial under-
standing of the relationship between the state and the citizenry, an
understanding repudiated during the New Deal. Under this tradi-
tional view, private ordering within the constraints of the common
law was natural and inviolate; government "intervention" was
therefore subject to special standards.4" But in the post-Lochner
era, there is nothing "natural" about private ordering pursuant to
common law standards. In these circumstances, an approach that
would treat statutory rights differently from common law
rights-because the latter seemed more important than the for-
mer-became difficult to defend.
Finally, courts have recognized that, as a general rule, political
remedies are no more readily available to beneficiaries of regula-
tion than to members of the regulated class. Indeed, regulated
class members are often well-organized and may be better able to
take advantage of the political process. Members of the beneficiary
class, on the other hand, may be quite diffuse and thus unable to
overcome transactions costs barriers to the exercise of political
influence. 48
These understandings suggest that the dangers of factional
power over governmental processes are no greater in the context of
too much regulation than in the context of too little. Administra-
tive law, including doctrines of judicial review, should therefore re-
flect a concern with unlawful inaction and deregulation as well as
with unlawful regulation. This understanding, a significant depar-
Stewart, supra note 24, at 1556-59 (difficulty of determining "holders" of rights and appro-
priate degree of protection of those rights).
4' Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
46 See B. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law 6-11 (1983); Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1746-48 (1976); Kennedy, supra
note 27, at 964-67.
'7 Decisions to allow the common law system to remain intact are themselves choices that
must be justified. See B. Ackerman, On Getting What We Don't Deserve, 1 Soc. Phil. &
Pol'y 60 (1983); Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 470 (1923).
" See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 723-28 (1985); Fi-
orina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39
Pub. Choice 33, 49 (1982).
1986]
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ture from the orginial conception of the APA,49 is to some extent
reflected in current law. Even after the recent decision in Heckler
v. Chaney,50 inaction is frequently reviewable, 51 and deregulation is
subject to the same standards as regulation. 52 Moreover, congres-
sional and executive mechanisms of oversight apply to failure to
regulate as well as to regulation.5
This is not to suggest that inaction and deregulation will fre-
quently be overturned by courts. Indeed, the absence of compli-
ance costs and enforcement costs will often argue in favor of both
inaction and deregulation. In some settings, moreover, inaction
stems from special considerations that call for judicial deference.
For example, agencies that fail to act often are responding to a
limited budget from which enforcement resources must be allo-
cated. In addition, statutes will sometimes fail to set forth stan-
dards by which to assess a claim of unlawful inaction, and in such
settings inaction should be unreviewable.4
These factors suggest that administrative inaction should not al-
ways be treated the same as action; but they do not undermine the
basic conclusion that threats to statutory programs have been gen-
erated by inaction and deregulation as well as by regulation. This
understanding has brought about and should continue to produce
significant changes in administrative law from both Congress and
reviewing courts.
49 See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 177.
-0 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985). For a discussion of the implications of Chaney for judicial re-
view of agency inaction, see Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney,
52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653 (1985).
51 See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 105 S. Ct. 1598 (1985); United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agricultural Workers v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Schering Corp. v.
Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (agency inaction reviewable where substantive
statute provides guidelines for agency to follow in exercising its enforcement power); Rob-
bins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (same); Iowa ex rel. Miller v.
Block, 771 F.2d 347, 350 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985).
52 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983);
Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel, 610 F. Supp. 1489, 1502 (D.D.C. 1985).
53 See, e.g., Role of the Office of Management and Budget in Regulation: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
"' See Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1656-57 (1985); Sunstein, supra note 50, at 673.
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III. EXPERTISE AND POLITICS: A DELIBERATIVE CONCEPTION OF
ADMINISTRATION
A. Faction, Deliberation, and Technical Expertise
The debate over the respective roles of "expertise" and "polit-
ics" in agency decisionmaking has proved to be one of the most
persistent in administrative law.55 Agencies were created in a pe-
riod of faith in administrative expertise, but this faith has been
severely undermined in the last two decades. Indeed, the fortieth
anniversary of the APA comes in the midst of a revival, still some-
what tentative, of the view that regulatory decisions are almost en-
tirely "political" in character and that expertise has at most a de-
rivative role to play.56 But that view is as misleading as its
opposite.
The principal virtue of technical knowledge is that it informs
regulatory decisions by shedding light on their potential effects.
Those effects may turn out to be different from what was ex-
pected, and the differences-showing substantial benefits or sub-
stantial costs-may persuade people with disparate views to agree
on a particular regulatory question. For example, a study may
show that the benefits of regulating a particular carcinogen are
likely to be high and that the regulation is justified by almost any
standard.
Information of this sort will rarely be conclusive, however, and
its usefulness will often depend upon value judgments, which must
be made in accordance with the governing statute. If, as will often
be the case, the statute is silent, there is considerable room for
discretion. Of central importance here is the task of ensuring that
the relevant considerations, including the actual value judgments
by the agency, are disclosed to the public and subjected to general
scrutiny and review. Administrative and judicial efforts to solve
" See J. Landis, The Administrative Process 23 (1938); Frug, The Ideology of Bureau-
cracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 1296-1334 (1984).
5' See Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782-83 (1984), reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct.
28 (1984); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985) (subjecting regulatory process to
OMB control). See also Scalia, Two Wrongs Make a Right: The Judicialization of Standar-
dless Rulemaking, Regulation July-Aug. 1977, at 38, 40 (regulation should "reflect the same
forces that work upon the legislature itself"); Shapiro, On Predicting the Future of Adminis-
trative Law, 6 Reg., May-June 1982, at 18, 20-21 (describing a "political theory" of
regulation).
1986]
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this problem have come in the form of a deliberative conception of
administration, a conception that amounts to a significant refor-
mulation of previous understandings. 57
It is useful to begin here with the idea that the role of the ad-
ministrator is not merely to reflect constituent pressures or to ag-
gregate private interests. 5 Instead, the purpose of the regulatory
process is to select and implement the values that underlie the
governing statute and that, in the absence of statutory guidance,
must be found through a process of deliberation. This is not to
deny that the promotion of (particular) private interests is often a
legitimate function of regulation; a decision to aid welfare benefi-
ciaries, workers, or consumers is of course permissibly "public" in
the post-Lochner era. In deciding how to implement the statute,
however, the administrator must deliberate about the relevant in-
terests and not respond mechanically to constituent pressures s.5  In
some respects, this understanding constitutes the core requirement
of the APA review provisions.
57 See infra text accompanying notes 64-68.
58 See Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94
Yale L.J. 1617, 1626-27 (1985).
59 Judge Easterbrook argues that courts should study the "deal" set up by the various
"parties" to statutes, and that courts have no authority to impose requirements that go
beyond the terms of the deal. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 540-
44 (1983); Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol. 87, 87-89 (1984). In the context at hand, this argument would suggest that courts
should inspect statutes to determine whether the deal requires mechanical reactions or, in-
stead, agency deliberations.
This argument is vulnerable, however, on three grounds. First, "deals" are generally inde-
terminate. Often Congress intentionally leaves issues open for judicial resolution; if courts
are to be faithful to the "deal" itself, statutory silence should not be read as a negation of
judicial authority. Second, the "deals" conception is usually a misleading characterization of
statutes because it grossly oversimplifies the nature of the political process. See A. Maass,
Congress and the Common Good 3-5 (1983); Stewart, supra note 24, at 1547-54. Finally,
even where a statute is properly understood as a "deal," it is by no means clear that courts
should treat it as such: the constitutional framework may be understood as an effort to
ensure that statutes are in the public interest, and laws should be read with that purpose in
mind. See Macey, Special Interest Groups and Statutory Interpretation, 86 Colum. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29
(1985). It is thus highly artificial to suggest that Congress intended agencies to respond
mechanically to constituent pressures-especially in light of underlying APA stan-
dards-and, even if there is evidence that it did, courts should at least employ "clear state-
ment" principles against that result.
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Notwithstanding its vagueness, this conception of politics has
considerable descriptive 60 and normative61 power. In contrast, the
theoretical foundations of interest-group pluralism have been un-
dermined in recent years, 2 with a growing recognition that efforts
to aggregate private preferences may be incoherent63 or may con-
ceal usurpation of governmental processes by powerful private fac-
tions. A deliberative understanding of administration has therefore
played an important role in modern administrative law.
The deliberative approach has significant advantages over its
major competitors and predecessors, each of which fails to provide
an adequate conception of the role of the administrator. Under one
view, prominent at the time the APA was enacted, the role of the
courts is to require fidelity to statute.6 4 Although that function
should be uncontroversial, the notion, standing by itself, often fails
adequately to constrain agency action because of the open-ended
character of many statutory standards-an especially disturbing
problem in light of the courts' express authority to invalidate "ar-
bitrary and capricious" 65 decisions. Another view is that, where
statutes do not provide to the contrary, courts may constrain the
exercise of discretion by requiring administrative agencies to mea-
sure and balance the costs and benefits of regulatory action.6 Al-
though an understanding of costs and benefits is a necessary com-
ponent of review for arbitrariness, such an assessment is a political
rather than a judicial responsibility. A third approach, prominent
in the 1970's,67 sought to ensure participation on the part of all
affected interests. That approach foundered in light of four consid-
erations: the fact that the relevant representatives were self-select-
ing; the weaknesses in the notion that the purpose of administra-
"o See A. Maass, supra note 59, at 5.
" See Sunstein, supra note 59, at 81-85. Indeed, this understanding of the importance of
deliberation by national political actors captures an important strain in the theory underly-
ing the Constitution itself.
62 See, e.g., J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis 123-24 (1975); T. Spragens, The Irony of
Liberal Reason 301-10 (1981).
43 See W. Riker, Liberalism versus Populism (1983); K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individ-
ual Values (1951); see also Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Polit-
ical Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81, 98-99 (1985) ("responsiveness to the will of the people
is not a unitary phenomenon").
See Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 507, 586-91 (1985).
65 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
' See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1978).
17 See Stewart, supra note 37, at 1711-12.
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tion is to aggregate preferences; the unlikelihood that, even if
preference-aggregation were desirable, it would be accomplished by
a judicially-administered system of interest-representation; and
the possibility that such procedures would impose costs not justi-
fied by improvements in administrative outcomes.68
Although the deliberative approach to administration avoids
most of the problems associated with these alternatives, significant
difficulties do arise in the effort to implement this approach. The
principal question for administrative agencies and reviewing courts
is how to define the relevant values. When the values are set out in
the governing statute, the answer is easy: the statutory resolution
will govern in the absence of a constitutional defect. The major
difficulties arise where, as is frequently the case, the statute is am-
biguous, and the administrator must ascertain values through a
more open-ended process. The statutory prohibition set out in the
APA applies to decisions that are "arbitrary and capricious," but
that standard is by no means self-defining. Certainly the standard
suggests that some decisions may be unlawful although they are
not prohibited by statute: the APA calls for a reasonably aggres-
sive judicial role for review of discretion even where the governing
statute is silent. A central purpose of the standard is to ensure that
agency decisions are not simply bows in the direction of powerful
private groups.6 9 This general instruction in the APA provides a
"background rule" against which any legislative "deal" must be
read.70
To manage this problem of defining relevant values, and to ac-
commodate permissible uses of both expertise and politics, courts
have created a four-pronged notion of "reasoned decisionmak-
ing. ' 7 1 First, regulatory decisions should be based on a detailed in-
quiry into the advantages and disadvantages of proposed courses
of action-where advantages and disadvantages are not defined
merely as "costs" and "benefits" in the economic sense of willing-
ness to pay-and an examination of reasonable alternatives. Sec-
ond, issues involving value judgments must be resolved consist-
68 For a discussion of some of these problems, see id. at 1760-89.
'9 See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 198-99 (discussing the legislative history of the APA).
70 See supra note 59.
71 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-44
(1983).
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ently with the governing statute. 2 Some factors will be irrelevant
under the statute, others must be considered, and some are rele-
vant but may not be made dispositive. This component borrows
from the "fidelity" approach to administrative law7" but provides a
less mechanical understanding of the process of statutory construc-
tion. Under this view, statutes do not simply dictate or prohibit
choices; they also suggest the values that must inform agency deci-
sions that fall within statutory "gaps. '74
Third, to the extent that issues of value are to be resolved
through an excercise of administrative discretion, the relevant con-
siderations and the actual bases for decision must be explicitly
identified and subjected to public scrutiny and review. 75 Finally,
the agency's resolution must reflect a reasonable weighing of the
relevant factors. "Reasonable" is defined by reference to the gov-
erning statute and, if the statute offers no help, to an approach
based on common sense and social consensus. 6 At this stage, the
administrator is accorded considerable deference. 77
These guidelines furnish considerable aid to administrators and
courts. In State Farm,75 for example, the principal problem was
that the agency decided to abandon the passive restraint regula-
tion altogether and failed to address the question of airbags simply
because the industry had decided to comply with the regulation by
using possibly ineffective nondetachable belts.79 The lurking con-
cern was that some other motivation, not expressed by the agency
or subject to public review, accounted for the decision.80 Under the
71 For example, a strong preference for private ordering-at least if it "trumps" other
considerations-may be inconsistent with the congressional decision to create the regulatory
scheme in the first instance.
7 See supra text accompanying note 64.
71 See infra text accompanying note 101.
76 The requirement of scrutiny of the actual basis of decision does not mean examining
the subjective motivations of the agency official, see United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,
420 (1941), but instead that agency decisions will not be upheld on any basis not articulated
by the agency, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
70 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48
(1983).
7 For a striking recent example, see Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1347-
49 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
' 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
7, Id. at 49.
go Cf. id. at 43 (administrative judgment reflected "not a change of opinion on the effec-
tiveness of the technology, but a change in plans by the automobile industry").
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APA and implementing doctrines,8' this is an impermissible use of
"politics" in administration; the motivation may have been irrele-
vant under the statute and, in any event, had not been subject to
the normal process of scrutiny.
In this light, it should not be surprising that the notion of "cap-
ture" has proved of special importance in the cases. The State
Farm Court referred to industry influence,82 and in Public Citizen
v. Steed,8 3 the court emphasized the agency's reliance on the tread-
wear grading practices of tire manufacturers. To be sure, both reg-
ulation and deregulation are frequently attacked as the product of
faction. 4 In general, however, courts define the phenomenon of
"capture" not by reference to outcomes, but by reference to the
process the agency has followed in implementing its program: has
it reacted to pressure, or has it deliberated? Of course, such an
approach creates difficulties for judicial review of administrative
processes, and these difficulties are aggravated when administra-
tors act on the basis of mixed motivations or when numerous ad-
ministrators are responsible for the ultimate decision. This ap-
proach also creates a danger of judicial usurpation85 in the form of
decisions that invalidate agency action because of substantive
views on the part of courts that cannot be tied to underlying statu-
tory policies.
Moreover, the notion of mechanical-reaction-to-pressure must
sometimes be understood as a metaphor for a complex process in
which administrators come to share the values of particular af-
fected parties and their approaches to regulatory issues.8 6 Regard-
less of whether the agency's response is mechanical or more com-
plex, however, it is inconsistent with an approach to
administration that would properly accommodate expertise and
81 See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (courts may not uphold agency
action for reasons not articulated by the agency).
82 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 49.
83 733 F.2d 93, 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
On regulation as "capture," see, e.g., R. Noll. & B. Owen, supra note 7, at 26-65; G.
Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation 178-88 (1975). On deregulation as
capture, see Garland, supra note 64, at 518-19.
85 See R. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act 3-4, 10-13
(1983).
88 See generally P. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies 43-174
(1981) (examining forces shaping administrators' attitudes); L. Schlozman & J. Tierney, Or-
ganized Interests and American Bureaucracy (1985).
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politics in the regulatory process. The various components of the
deliberative approach may be understood as a means of simplifying
the judicial inquiry.8 7 Those components are designed to help
"flush out" impermissible motivations without looking into subjec-
tive states of mind, and at the same time to minimize judicial in-
trusions on the merits. The goal, imperfectly realized in practice, is
to guard against the dangers of self-interested representation and
of factional tyranny in the regulatory process.
B. Formalism and the Chevron Approach
The rise of a deliberative conception of administration holds out
considerable promise for accommodating both expertise and polit-
ics in regulatory policy. In a potentially important development,
however, the Supreme Court has sharply restricted the scope of
judicial review of agency decisions with respect to "policy."
In Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC,8 s the Court confronted the EPA's
"bubble policy," which allows states to adopt a plantwide defini-
tion of the term "stationary source." Under this policy, an existing
plant with several pollution-emitting devices may install one piece
of equipment that does not meet the plant's permit conditions if
the alteration does not increase total emissions from the plant. All
pollution-emitting devices are thus treated as if they were encased
in a single "bubble."89 In reviewing the EPA's policy, the Court
concluded that the agency was due considerable deference if "Con-
gress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue."' 0
More recently, in Chemical Manufacturers Association v. NRDC,91
837 The State Farm case is again an example. At issue there was a passive restraints regu-
lation rescinded in large part because the automobile industry had selected an ineffective
means of compliance with the regulation. Instead of imposing an effective means of re-
straint, the agency rescinded the regulation entirely. Inspection of the connection between
statutory goals and the means chosen by the agency to promote those goals-and the find-
ing that the connection was attenuated-suggested that other goals may have been at work.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983).
The failure to explore reasonable alternatives may also suggest an absence of deliberation. If
the means-ends connection is weak, or if the evidence invoked in justification of deregula-
tion is insubstantial, there is reason to believe that something else-illegitimate considera-
tions, including factional pressure-accounts for the action.
8 104 S. Ct. 2778, reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 28 (1984).
"' See id. at 2778-79; 40 CFR §51.18 (j)(i)-(ii) (1983).
10 Id. at 2782.
91 105 S. Ct. 1102, 1108 (1985).
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the Court required deference to the agency "unless the legislative
history or the purposes and structure of the statute clearly reveal a
contrary intent on the part of Congress." 92
These cases set out a "clear statement" principle of the sort that
has played an important role in recent Supreme Court decisions.9 3
The appeal of the principle is straightforward and closely con-
nected with the positivist notion of law as the will of the sovereign:
if the sovereign has not expressed a preference on the precise issue,
the agency's decision is unconstrained. At the same time, the prin-
ciple appears sharply to limit judicial authority, attempting to en-
sure that judicial outcomes will reflect something other than the
value choices of judges. Finally, the principle might be thought to
serve an important separation of powers function: it ensures that
when Congress has not expressly resolved an issue, the decision
will be made by a specialized, politically accountable administra-
tor, rather than by technically unsophisticated, unaccountable
judges. In particular, those subject to presidential control will set
policies."4
The "clear statement" principle could have dramatic implica-
tions, for Congress has rarely "directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue" in any particular case. But for three reasons, the
Chevron approach is an unacceptable basis for judicial review:95
the approach is unlikely to serve Congress' own goals and expecta-
tions; it undervalues the possibility of extrapolating principles
from statutory standards; and its conception of separation of pow-
ers fails in light of the uneasy constitutional position of the admin-
istrative agency. The Chevron understanding cannot, therefore,
provide a shield against the twin dangers of self-interested repre-
sentation and factional power, and its failure to do so does not
serve the legislative will.
92 Id.
" See generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Inter-
pretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892, 899-912 (1982) (discussing range of
cases in which the Supreme Court has invoked clear statement principle in reading
statutes).
See Mashaw, supra note 63, at 95-99.
" See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1199-1201 (flaws of "formalist thesis"); Note,
supra note 93, at 904-07 (rationales behind clear statement approach are flawed).
[Vol. 72:271
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1. "Meta-intent"
It is a commonplace that Congress cannot anticipate every prob-
lem that will arise in the administration of a statute; indeed, this is
an important reason for the delegation of administrative power in
the first place. In these circumstances, the judicial role cannot be
limited to cases in which Congress has decided issues "expressly."
The APA reflects a congressional desire to strengthen judicial re-
view, a desire based largely on concerns about self-interested rep-
resentation and factional influences over administrative
processes."" Judicial review increases both agency conformity to
statute97 and, where the statute is unclear, the likelihood that the
agency will exercise its discretion in a way that does not reflect the
agency's self-interest and that avoids the undue influence of pri-
vate groups. The provisions of the APA, in particular review for
substantial evidence and for arbitrariness, call for a significant role
for the courts even without "express" congressional judgment on
the matter. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that the
APA drafters may well have intended informal rulemaking to be
subject to de novo review from the courts.98
If there has been evidence of congressional preference since the
adoption of the APA, and if that evidence is thought to be rele-
vant,99 the legislative concern is that there is too much judicial def-
96 See H.R. Rep. No. 1149, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939), reprinted in Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, at 244 (1946) [here-
inafter referred to as "Legislative History"] ("the law must provide that the governors shall
be governed and the regulators shall be regulated, if our present form of government is to
endure"); 92 Cong. Rec. 2149 (1946), reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 299 (agencies
"are in reality miniature independent governments . . . constitut[ing] a headless 'fourth
branch' of the Government. . . . The evils resulting from this confusion of principles are
insidious and far-reaching .... Pressures and influences . . . constitute an unwholesome
atmosphere in which to adjudicate private rights. . . ."). See also Sunstein, supra note 50,
at 199.
97 Oddly, this effect is acknowledged but criticized as allowing for insufficient flexibility
in R. Melnick, supra note 85, at 8-16.
8 See Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Stan-
dards of Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Stat-
utes, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 721, 754-55 (1975); Nathanson, The.Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 183,
190-91 (1979).
9 It probably should not be so regarded; the meaning of the governing statute, rather
than intervening expressions of congressional intent not embodied in law, is controlling. But
it is at least informative to find congressional concern that there is too little judicial control.
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erence to agency decisions."' The evidence suggests that Congress
itself would hardly be satisfied with the Chevron standard.
2. Extrapolating Principles
In the positivist view, the realm of discretion and the realm of
constraint are sharply distinct: if Congress has not "specifically"
prohibited agency action, the agency may do whatever it chooses.
This vision is a highly artificial and inflexible approach to statu-
tory interpretation, however, because it disregards the possibility
of extrapolating from statutes principles that guide the exercise of
discretion even when Congress has not specifically addressed the
problem. 101 Statutory standards are designed to guide the exercise
of discretion even in unforeseen cases. Congress may have decided
that some factors are entitled to little or no weight, even if it has
not addressed the specific problem to which those factors are
applied.
The State Farm'02 case is a good illustration here. Congress had
not specifically addressed the issue of passive restraints, but it had
concluded that safety merited particular emphasis in the regula-
tory process-more emphasis than it would receive under a (con-
ventional) cost-benefit analysis.10 3 It was thus possible to conclude
that the agency's discretion was constrained even in a setting to
which Congress had given no thought. The conclusion holds even
if, after proper findings had been made, it would be lawful to
forego passive restraints altogether.
The point that emerges is quite general: statutory provisions fur-
nish guidance even if Congress has not expressly dealt with a par-
ticular question. Agency decisions may be unlawful when they de-
pend on judgments of value-for example, disregarding some
100 A version of the "Bumpers Amendment," S. 86, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec.
639 (1977), a proposed revision of the APA that would increase judicial scrutiny of agency
decisions, has been reintroduced in Congress in every session since 1977. J. Mashaw & R.
Merrill, Administrative Law: The American Public Law System 383 (2d ed. 1985).
1"I There are of course risks in such an approach. Courts may extrapolate principles at a
level of generality that tends to undermine the statutory rule itself. Thus, the principles
must to the extent possible be defined by reference to the rule and must not be separated
from it. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 59, at 544. It is therefore necessary
to use extrapolated principles only to fill in actual gaps in statutes, not to defeat statutes
where there are no such gaps.
12 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 462 U.S. 29 (1983).
103 Id. at 54-55.
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factors and underemphasizing others-that the statute forecloses.
The notion that the process of statutory construction consists of a
search for an "explicit" legislative decision, and that enforceable
constraints disappear if the search is unavailing, rests on an un-
supportable understanding of the interpretative process.
3. The Uneasy Position of the Administrative Agency
Many of the dilemmas in administrative law arise from the un-
easy constitutional position of the administrative agency. 04 Statu-
tory guidelines rarely provide much in the way of clear constraints,
and Congress as a whole exercises little control during the imple-
mentation process. 05 Recent Presidents have exercised more su-
pervisory power, 10 6 but such control is necessarily intermittent,
and in any event it does not appear to be a complete solution.107
The uneasy position of the administrative agency has produced
relatively strict judicial supervision, usually with the authorization
of Congress. The fear is that the absence of the usual electoral
safeguards renders agencies particularly susceptible to the pres-
sures imposed by powerful private groups.' In the context of re-
viewing agency conduct, the vices of the courts turn out to be vir-
tues, and separation of powers concerns tend to argue in favor of
an aggressive judicial role. Although there are risks in both direc-
tions, judicial insulation from political accountability is a safe-
guard, even if an imperfect one, against the risks of violation of
statute and of decision in accordance with agency self-interest or
private pressures." Because Congress shares this view," 0 it is
'0 See S. Breyer & R. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy ch. 1 (2d ed.
1985).
105 See R. Litan & W. Nordhaus, Reforming Federal Regulation 66 (1983).
106 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 431-34 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985). See also infra text
accompanying notes 118-125.
107 For an exploration of the dangers of factionalism raised by such control, see Morrison,
Presidential Intervention in Informal Rulemaking: Striking the Proper Balance, 56 Tul. L.
Rev. 879, 890-93 (1982); see also Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act-A Living
and Responsive Law, 72 Va. L. Rev. (1986); Morrison, OMB Interference With Agency
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1985).
108 Many judge-made doctrines are a response to this fear. Consider, for example, the
requirement of disclosure of ex parte contacts. See Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d'9, 51-
59 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
10 See L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 322-23 (1965).
See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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quite odd to argue that deference to the legislature argues against
rather than in favor of a moderately aggressive judicial role.
These considerations suggest that a deliberative approach to'ad-
ministration, accommodating expertise and politics, is a far Ietter
judicial strategy than the "clear statement" principle of Chevron.
Taken to its logical extreme, the Chevron principle would author-
ize agencies to respond to the available information and to constit-
uent pressures however they choose, absent an express congres-
sional judgment on the point. Such an approach would sacrifice
much of what has been gained in our understanding of the rela-
tionship between technical knowledge on one hand and politics on
the other, and one might therefore hope that the Court will retreat
from this view in the near future.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES AND THE NEED FOR
ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS OF CONTROL
The considerations that support a deliberative approach to ad-
ministration argue in favor of a moderately aggressive judicial role,
but it has become increasingly clear in the last decade that review-
ing courts have difficulty handling many of the malfunctions of the
administrative process. Although the drafters of the APA believed
such malfunctions to be one-shot deviations subject to judicial cor-
rection,"" the most important problems are structural or systemic
in character. An agency may adopt an agenda that serves its own
interests" or that helps powerful private groups and no one else.
This phenomenon of "government failure" parallels the "market
failure" that often gives rise to a regulatory scheme in the first
instance. Judicial review, operating on a case-by-case basis, is an
imperfect remedy for these problems. 1
See, e.g., 92 Cong. Rec. 5659 (1946), reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 96, at
383-84 (1946).
112 See, e.g., P. Quirk, supra note 86, at 96-142.
13 Experience with systemic problems in the regulatory process has confirmed this per-
ception. See Women's Equity Action League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (injunction
requiring Departments of Education and Labor to enforce civil rights laws); see also Note,
Judicial Control of Systemic Inadequacies in Federal Administrative Enforcement, 88 Yale
L.J. 407, 423-25 (1978) (describing litigation over HEW's alleged nonenforcement of the civil
rights laws); see generally D. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 33-56 (1977) (judicial
focus on particular case makes courts ill-suited to resolve issues of social policy); R. Melnick,
supra note 85, at 14-16 (discussing limitations of case-by-case review).
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The principal problem is that courts have difficulty engaging in
the kind of managerial tasks that are essential to successful sys-
temic change. 114 Continuous supervision of the administrative pro-
cess is impossible to achieve through adjudication, yet such super-
vision is of special importance in light of the "polycentric" ' 5
character of administrative decisions, where action in one setting
may have unanticipated adverse consequences for other forms of
regulatory intervention. These problems are aggravated by the in-
ability of courts to impose a coordinated or hierarchical structure,
by their lack of familiarity with the often technically complex is-
sues at hand, and by their lack of political accountability.
Courts should, however, be available to hear complaints of struc-
tural or systemic illegalities. To withdraw this function from the
courts would be a cure worse than the disease, especially in light of
the fact that the prospect of judicial review serves as a deterrent to
unlawful agency conduct before decisions are made." 6 Indeed, the
prospect of review is an important safeguard against both systemic
and one-shot illegalities. Nevertheless, experience has demon-
strated that nonjudicial review mechanisms are necessary to sup-
plement and, if they are successful, to displace judicial solutions. 17
A useful example is the increasing authority of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) over the regulatory process. Two
recent executive orders, building on the budgetary model, have
given OMB considerable supervisory power. Executive Order
12291118 requires agencies to submit proposed rules to OMB for
review and comment; OMB scrutinizes the proposed rules for con-
sistency with the administration's regulatory program. Executive
Order 12498119 requires agencies to submit annual "regulatory pro-
grams" to OMB, allowing OMB to perform a supervisory role anal-
ogous to that which it plays in the budgetary process. 120 The two
11 For a general discussion, see D. Horowitz, supra note 113, at 33-56.
"ll See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 394-404
(1978).
"I For a discussion of the phenomenon of "anticipated reaction," see C. Friedrich, Con-
stitutional Government and Democracy 589-91 (1941).
117 See J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice 198 (1983).
118 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431 (1982).
"1 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985).
120 See Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of OMB and the President in Informal Rulemaking,
Administrative Law Review (forthcoming in Ad. L. Rev.) (manuscript on file with Virginia
Law Review Association).
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orders are intended to ensure consistency and coordination of the
regulatory process, to increase the authority of agency heads over
their staffs by bringing matters to political attention at an early
stage, to ensure that the regulatory program is both subject to
public scrutiny and conducted consistently with the political objec-
tives of the administration, and to promote political accountability
over the regulatory process by increasing the power of those close
to the President. 121
In some respects, OMB has performed the function of reviewing
courts under the "hard look" standard of review.'22 The OMB ini-
tiatives offer considerable promise for remedying structural or sys-
temic defects that courts are ill-suited to solve. For example,
problems that arise from an agency's effort to serve its own inter-
ests or those of regulated class members may better be solved by
presidential supervision than by adjudication. The national con-
stituency of the President and OMB may enable them to avoid the
parochial interests of agencies, which sometimes are unduly subject
to the power of client industries,123 and they may also bring to bear
a broader perspective on the particular problem. In some settings,
agencies have an unfortunate mix of insulation and responsiveness:
they do not have the independence of courts, which is a safeguard
against some kinds of private pressure, and lacking the national
constituency of the White House, they are subject to constituent
pressures in a way that renders them comparatively unresponsive.
OMB supervision may of course generate risks of its own, princi-
pally in the form of increased power by private groups with dispro-
portionate access to OMB officials. 124 The creation of a second low-
visibility decision may also increase rather than diminish the dan-
gers of self-interested representation and factional tyranny. But it
121 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
431, 432 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985).
21 See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (the "hard
look" standard is used to describe "the rigorous standard of judicial review applied to ...
informal rulemaking proceedings or to other decisions made upon less than a full trial-type
record").
123 On this phenomenon, see Stewart, supra note 37, at 1682-83.
324 See Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 Va. J. Nat.
Resources Law 1, 28-35 (1984). According to some, the experience under the recent execu-
tive orders suggests this possibility. See id.; G. Eads & M. Fix, Relief or Reform? Reagan's
Regulatory Dilemma 135-38 (1984).
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is both illuminating and encouraging to find that the debate over
the process has focused on whether OMB has in fact improved de-
liberation by coordinating and centralizing the national regulatory
program. There is a common ground in the view that OMB's func-
tion is to improve deliberative processes, accommodating both
expertise and politics, in the way suggested above. 125 The rhetoric
of the debate thus reveals a similar understanding of the function
of the regulatory process.
In any event, if the relevant risks are controlled-as they have
been in the budgetary context-mechanisms like OMB supervision
will be an important and valuable supplement to judicial review.
Such mechanisms are hardly a panacea, but they are far more
likely than adjudication to respond to structural or systemic inade-
quacies in the administrative process.12 6
III. CONCLUSION
The four lessons that have emerged since the enactment of the
APA shed considerable light on the continuing reformulation of
administrative law. The ability to identify the functions and mal-
functions of regulation should improve both regulatory policy and
judicial review. Knowledge about the risks of unlawful inaction
and deregulation has made it important to redesign legal doctrines
and institutions. More refined understandings of the relationship
between expertise and politics have generated a conception of ad-
ministration that is useful both to agency officials and to reviewing
courts. Finally, the limitations of the courts in supervising admin-
istrative discretion have led to a search for alternative mechanisms
of control; some such mechanisms, already in place, constitute an
important first step in this regard.
All of these lessons should make it easier to carry out what re-
mains the central effort of administrative law and of the separa-
tion of powers more generally: reducing the risks of self-interested
representation and of factional control over governmental
processes. Recent and still-tentative developments jeopardizing ju-
dicial review of agency inaction and the deliberative approach to
115 See supra text accompanying notes 71-86.
124 Other mechanisms for political control on the part of the President and the Congress
have similar advantages over judicial review. See, e.g., Litan & Nordhaus, supra note 105, at
133-58 (discussing regulatory budget).
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administration should be firmly resisted. To be sure, is important
to be cautious about the potential effects of procedural and insti-
tutional controls; devices of that sort are unlikely to be able to
eliminate the relevant risks, which will exist in any system of rep-
resentative government. But the experience of the last forty years
has not belied the expectation of the APA drafters that institu-
tional mechanisms can provide valuable safeguards.
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